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I. INTRODUCTION
With the onset of skyrocketing electric bills and rolling blackouts, the
Governor, the Legislature, and the people of California are asking two questions:
How did we get into this situation? And what can we do to get out of it?
Consumers are demanding frozen electric rates,' one investor-owned public
utility has already filed bankruptcy, and others may follow.3 Federal officials are
calling for price caps, power generators are urging for expansion of California's
in-state power plants,5 and the out-of-state power generators are running all the
way to the bank with their open-market profits.6 Everyone agrees that something
needs to be done immediately; however, opinions vary greatly on how to correct
California's power problem.7
During an extraordinary legislative session, the Legislature passed Chapter 3
as a temporary solution.8 This statute authorized the Department of Water
Resources (DWR) to enter into contracts with energy suppliers to buy and sell
electricity in an effort to supplement the net shortages of electricity provided by
California's investor-owned utilities. Second, the Legislature extended the
DWR's authorization to buy and sell electricity until January 1, 2003, and to
issue revenue bonds.' ° Third, the Legislature made clarifying and modifying
changes to the revenue provisions of Chapter 4."
1. See Letter from Nettie Hoge, Executive Director, The Utility Reform Network (TURN), to Rod
Pacheco, Assemblymember (Sept. 26, 2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that California
is bailing out rich, investor-owned utilities at the expense of consumers).
2. In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 263 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001).
3. See Dan Walters, Blackout Threat Dims, but California Still Faces Tough Energy Decisions,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 2001, http:/www.sacbee.comnews/special/powerlO72501walters.html (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that Southern California Edison would likely follow Pacific
Gas and Electric into bankruptcy).
4. CAL. ST. AUDITOR BUREAU OF ST. AUDITS, Energy Deregulation: The Benefits of Competition Were
Undermined by Structural Flaws in the Market, Unsuccessful Oversight, and Uncontrollable Competitive
Forces, No. 2000-134.1R, at 27 (2001).
5. See Powerful Ideas: Solutions for Rebuilding California's Troubled Electricity Market, INDEPENDENT
ENERGY PRODUCERS, May 2, 2001, at 21 [hereinafter Powerful Ideas] (indicating that in March 2001 the
California Energy Commission had received eleven applications for power plant expansion from developers).
6. See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, REPORT TO GRAY DAVIS: California's Electricity
Options and Challenges 18 [hereinafter CPUC Report], available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedl
report/govjreport.htm (last visited July 30, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that
power companies reported extraordinary profits in the summer of 2000).
7. See Dan Walters, Great California Energy Crisis May Be Heading Toward a Climax, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 19, 2001, http://www.sacbee.com/news/special/power/062901walters.html (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing two levels of the energy crisis, both real and political).
8. CAL. WATER CODE § 200 (enacted by Chapter 3).
9. Id.
10. Id. §§ 80100-80122 (enacted by Chapter 4).
11. Id. §§ 80130, 80132, 80200 (amended by Chapter 9).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. How the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Placed
Deregulation in Motion
In December 1995, the CPUC issued a decision that required California's
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to purchase power from the federally regulated
wholesale market. 2 The federal wholesale market was created by the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 and is governed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). 3 Subsequently, the CPUC created the Independent System
Operator (ISO) and the California Power Exchange (PX) to facilitate
deregulation. 4 The ISO is responsible for maintaining the transmission grid for
all electrical power in California and keeping the electricity supply and demand
in balance in real time. The PX, which was disbanded in 2002, ran a daily
auction establishing publicly available hourly market prices for energy."
B. Legislative Response to CPUC: AB 1890
In 1996, the Legislature unanimously17 passed Chapter 854 (commonly
known and hereinafter referred to as AB 1890) under the framework of the 1995
decis8ons. Legislators intended AB 1890 to restructure theCPUC deregulation eii s gis trineddA 80 t
electric utility industry into a more competitive and efficient system that would
lower electrical rates for residential and commercial consumers. '9 AB 1890
mandated the IOUs: San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E), and Southern California Edison (SCE) to divest themselves of their
generation assets in an attempt to make the IOUs buy power on an open marketand ecourae .. 20
and encourage competition. The statute also established the opportunity for
12. See Letter from Bill Leonard, Assemblymember, to Assembly Republican Caucus Members (Feb. 7,
2001) [hereinafter Leonard Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing deregulation and the
background of the power crisis).
13. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13451 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
14. See CPUC Decision 95-12-063 (Dec. 28, 1995) (creating ISO and PX as the exclusive vehicles for
the selling and purchasing of all electric power in California (modified by D.96-01-009 on Jan. 10, 1996).
15. Powerful Ideas, supra note 5, at 11.
16. Id.
17. Senate vote, available at http://www.legalinfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1851-1900/ab_1890-
vote_96031-1142AM-sen-floor.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing 39 Ayes and 0
Noes); Assembly vote, available at http://www.legalinfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asmab_1851-1900/ab_1890_
vote_96083_0943PMasmfloor.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing 77 Ayes and 0
Noes).
18. Leonard Letter, supra note 12.
19. See ASSEMBLY PROPOSED CONFERENCE REPORT NO. 1, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS of AB 1890, at I
(Aug. 28, 1996), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1851-1900/ab_1890_cfa_
960905_11437_asm_floorhtml (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating the Bill's purpose: to
move to a competitive market, lower the cost of electricity, attract jobs, and reduce power outages).
20. 1996 Cal. Stat. Ch. 854, sec. 10, at 20 (enacting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(k)(1)).
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IOUs to regain the money spent on stranded assets2' and froze retail rates until an
IOU recovered its stranded assets, at which point the IOU could pass on the
actual costs of energy to consumers without a cap."' The statute further codified
the CPUC's creation of the ISO
23 and PX. 24
C. What Caused the Power Crisis?
Critics and supporters of deregulation have differing theories about the cause
of California's power crisis; however, many circumstances contributed to the
electrical shortages and rising consumer electric bills.25 First, industry and
population growth in California and other western states were significantly
greater than anyone predicted. 6 This growth caused an ever-increasing demand
for power which depleted California's electrical reserves.27 Second, under AB
1890, the California IOUs divested themselves of generation assets and other
states have been unable28 or unwilling 9 to export power to California. ° Third, in
the winter of 2000, the price of natural gas doubled, causing the generation costs
for natural gas fueled power plants to increase significantly. 3 Fourth, the
prohibition12 against long-term contracts caused IOUs to rely on spot purchases
and out-of-market purchases. 3  The volatile and high wholesale spot prices and
the necessity of out-of-market purchases at higher prices resulted in the inability
of the IOUs to obtain credit for future power purchases.34
21. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 330(q)-(w) (West 1975 & Supp. 2002) (defining stranded assets as an
IOU's investment in power generation).
22. Id.
23. See id. § 345 (West 1975 & Supp. 2002) (creating the ISO and defining its powers and duties).
24. See id. § 355 (West 1975 & Supp. 2002) (creating the PX and defining its powers and duties).
25. See CPUC Report, supra note 6, at 23, (stating the following reasons for California's power crisis:
inadequate new power supplies, increasing demand, aging existing power plants, limited transmission facilities,
and the State's reduced role in energy efficiency and construction of new resources); Lynne Kiesling, Getting
Electricity Deregulation Right: How Other States and Nations Have Avoided California's Mistakes, Policy
Study No. 281, REASON PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE (RPPI), Apr. 2001, available at http://www.rppi.
org/electele.html [hereinafter Kiesling Report] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the
following reasons for California's power crises: low default prices for incumbent utilities, mandatory divestiture
of generation assets, no accelerated phase-in period for all consumers to be allowed choice in electric supplier,
and one central power exchange).
26. See CPUC Report, supra note 6, at 26-27 (describing California's growing economy and the
increased demand for power).
27. Id.
28. Powerful Ideas, supra note 5, at 12-13.
29. See id. at 13 (describing the IOUs' credit problems).
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Anthony Pescetti, Old-Style Agency Stifles New Energy Market, Dec. 22, 2000 at 2 (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
33. Id.
34. Powerful Ideas, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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D. Governor's Broad Emergency Powers
The Governor declared a state of emergency on January 17, 2001"5 and was
thereby granted broad powers during the energy crisis.36 Those powers include
authorization to perform any acts that may be necessary to utilize the broad
powers granted during the state of emergency 7 including appropriating money
from any legally available fund to respond to the emergency. 8 Under this
authority, the Governor authorized the DWR to enter into contracts for the
purchase, distribution, transmission, and sale of electric power.9
E. Emergency Legislation Passed
On January 19, 2001, Governor Davis signed Chapter 3 authorizing the
DWR to enter contracts to buy and sell electricity. Chapter 3 also created the
Electrical Power Fund, and appropriated $400 million for that purpose.4° On
February 1, 2001, the Governor signed Chapter 4 to continue the DWR's
authorization to buy and sell electricity.4' On May 10, 2001, the Governor signed
Chapter 9, which contained modifications and technical additions to the revenue
provisions of Chapter 4.42 The purpose of the emergency legislation was to
authorize the DWR to supplement the IOUs' generation net shortages43 of
electricity to end rolling blackouts."
III. EXISTING LAW
Section 366.5 of the Public Utilities Code provides guidelines for changing
the aggregator or supplier of electric power4 for small commercial 6 and
35. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California, Jan. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.cueanic.com/members/Documents/govemelectergdeclar.PDF (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
36. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8625 (West 1992) (containing the California Emergency Services Act,
which authorizes the Governor to declare a state of emergency and gives him other broad powers, including the
power to appropriate funds from any source available to alleviate the risks and damage caused by the
emergency).
37. Id. § 8646 (West 1992).
38. Id. § 8645 (West 1992).
39. Id.
40. CAL. WATER CODE § 200 (enacted by Chapter 3).
41. Id. §§ 80100-80122 (enacted by Chapter 4).
42. Id. § § 80130, 80132, 80200 (amended by Chapter 9).
43. See ASSEMBLY ENERGY-UTILITIES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS of AB Ix, at 7 (Jan. 31,
2001) (defining a net shortage as the shortage that occurs when the electricity needs of the customers are not
being met by the generation assets owned by the utilities).
44. Id.
45. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 366.5(g), (i) (West 1975 & Supp. 2002) (listing the following two
exemptions to this section: (1) public agencies serving customers within their jurisdiction, and (2) electrical
corporations serving customers who default to their service).
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residential customers. 47 This section4' also provides guidelines for changing the
aggregator or supplier of electric power for residential customers via the
Internet.49 If the CPUC determines that unauthorized changes are occurring as a
result of section 366.5, it may mandate written confirmation for all residential
service-provider changes.50 In addition to the written confirmation required by
this section, the written confirmation must include an acknowledgment,5 which
cannot be included with a check or sweepstakes solicitation.52 The supplier of
electric power must keep all confirmations for at least two years from the date of
the confirmation. 3
If a supplier of electric power switches the service of a small commercial or
residential customer without that customer's consent, then that supplier is liable
to the former electric provider for revenues collected as a result of the switch.
The supplier is also liable to the customer for amounts paid by the customer over
the former electric provider's rate.55
IV. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Chapter 3
Chapter 3 authorized the DWR to enter contracts to buy and sell electricity to
supplement the IOUs' electric net shortage.56 This new legislation also
established in the State Treasury the DWR Electrical Power Fund (EPF) as a
continuously appropriated fund and transferred four million dollars from the
General Fund57 to the EPF. Chapter 3 also required all revenues collected by the
DWR under Chapter 3 to be deposited into the EPF.58 By its own terms, Chapter
46. Id. § 366.5(a).
47. Id. § 366.5(b).
48. Id. § 366.50) (amended by Chapter 4) (providing that "[e]lectrical power sold to customers pursuant
to Section 80100 of the Water Code is not subject to" section 366.5 of the Public Utilities Code).
49. See id. §§ 366.5(c), (c)(l)-(2) (requiring that before a customer may change the supplier of electric
power via an Internet transaction, the customer accessing the website of a supplier must respond to a separate
screen containing the language, "I acknowledge that in entering this transaction I am voluntarily choosing to
change the entity that supplies me with my electric power," and a separate screen shall offer the customer the
chance to complete or terminate the transaction).
50. Id. § 366.5(h).
51. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.5(d)(1) (containing the acknowledgment's required language).
52. Id. § 366.5(d)(2).
53. See id. § 366.5(f) (requiring the supplier of electric power to make the records available, upon
request, to the customer and to the CPUC).
54. Id. § 366.5(e).
55. Id.
56. CAL. WATER CODE § 200(b) (enacted by Chapter 3).
57. CAL Gov'T CODE § 16300 (West 1995) (establishing the General Fund and stating that the Fund
consists of money received into the treasury that is not required to be credited to any other fund).
58. CAL. WATER CODE § 200(f) (enacted by Chapter 3).
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3 became inoperative on February 2, 2001,'9 which prompted the Legislature to
extend the provisions of Chapter 3 by including them in Chapter 4.
B. Chapter 4
1. California Procurement Adjustment
The California Procurement Adjustment (CPA) is defined as the difference
between the cost of generating power and the retail rate generation charge. 60 The
CPUC is to determine what portion of CPA is allocable to DWR-acquired
power.6' Electrical corporations must then pay this amount to the DWR for
deposit into the Electric Power Fund.62
2. Powers Granted to the DWR
With the enactment of Chapter 4, the Legislature discontinued the Power
Exchange and repealed the mandate for utilities to obtain power through the
Power Exchange. 63 The DWR is authorized to purchase and sell power64 to retail65• • 66
end-use customers6' and certain publicly-owned utilities at prices determined by
specified variables. 67 The DWR is further authorized to adopt and implement
59. Id. § 200(k) (enacted by Chapter 3).
60. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 360.5 (enacted by Chapter 4).
61. Id.
62. Id.; see CAL. WATER CODE § 80200 (enacted by Chapter 4) (re-establishing the Electric Power Fund
in the State Treasury for the DWR).
63. ASSEMBLY ENERGY-UTILITIES COMMITTEE, ANALYSIS of AB lx, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2001).
64. See CAL. WATER CODE § 80002.5 (enacted by Chapter 4) (requiring the DWR to sell power to retail
end use customers on a pro rata basis).
65. CPUC, Rate Agreement By and Between State of California Department of Water Resources and
State of California Public Utilities Commission, Art. 1, § 1.1 at 4 (Sept. 6, 2001), available at http://www.
cpuc.ca.gov/published/report/93610PDF (copy on file with the McGeorge Low Review) (defining retail end-use
customers as customers within the service area of an electric corporation that has purchased power from the
DWR under Chapter 4).
66. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 9604 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002) (defining a publicly owned utility as:
a municipality or municipal corporation operating as a "public utility" furnishing electric
service as provided in section 10001, a municipal utility district furnishing electric
service formed pursuant to Division 6 (commencing with section 11501), a public utility
district furnishing electric services formed pursuant to the Public Utility District Act set
forth in Division 7 (commencing with section 15501), an irrigation district furnishing
electric services formed pursuant to the Irrigation District Law set forth in Division 11
(commencing with section 20500) of the Water Code, or a joint powers authority that
includes one or more of these agencies and that owns generation or transmission
facilities, or furnishes electric services over its own or its member's electric distribution
system.).
67. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 80100(a)-(f) (enacted by Chapter 4) (specifying the following variables to be
considered by the DWR in determining the price it is willing to pay for power: (1) the intent of this program is
to acquire contracts with "reliable service at the lowest price per kilowatthour," (2) the need for "contract
supplies to fit each aspect of the overall energy load profile," (3) "[t]he desire to severe as much low-cost power
380
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emergency regulations to carry out these provisions,68 with the limitation that the
DWR cannot take ownership of generation, transmission, or distribution assets.69
The CPUC is to set rates that cover revenue requirements of DWR.70 However,
rate increases are prohibited for residential customers who consume less than 130
percent of baseline quantities.7
The DWR's contracting power ends after January 1, 2003.7 During that time,
the DWR must make quarterly and annual reports to the Governor and the
Legislature, describing its activities and expenditures pursuant to Chapter 4.73
Chapter 4 further requires the Bureau of Audits to conduct financial and
performance audits of the DWR's implementation of the powers authorized
under Chapter 4.74
3. Electric Power Fund
Under Chapter 4, the Legislature transferred an additional $495,755,000
from the General Fund" to the EPF76 and requires repayment to the EPF from
revenues generated by this act.77 Chapter 4 also provides for the EPF to be
continuously funded during the statute's life.78 The Legislature further transferred
additional funds79 to the DWR for administrative costs for 2000 through 2001 and
authorized the DWR to hire staff with salaries that exceed the Department of
Personnel's standards."'
Pursuant to Chapter 4, the DWR is further authorized to issue revenue bonds
with Department of Finance and State Treasurer approval." The value of the
bonds cannot exceed four times the yearly CPA and also cannot pledge or
as possible," (4) "[t]he duration and timing of contracts," (5) the duration of the sellers' offers; and (6) "[t]he
desire to secure as much ... renewable energy as possible").
68. Id. § 80012 (enacted by Chapter 4).
69. Id.
70. See id. § 80110 (enacted by Chapter 4) (authorizing the CPUC to enter into an agreement with the
DWR regarding electricity rates).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 80260 (enacted by Chapter 4).
73. CAL. WATER CODE § 80250 (enacted by Chapter 4).
74. Id. § 80270 (enacted by Chapter 4) (requiring that the Bureau of State Audits complete an initial
report by December 31, 2001 and a final audit by March 31, 2003).
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16300 (West 1995).
76. CAL. WATER CODE § 80270(a) (enacted by Chapter 4).
77. Id. § 80200(b) (enacted by Chapter 4).
78. Id. § 80200(a) (enacted by Chapter 4).
79. Id. § 80270(b) (enacted by Chapter 4) (listing $4,245,000 for administrative costs).
80. See id. §§ 80122(a), 80270(b) (enacted by Chapter 4) (appropriating the additional funds for the
purpose of hiring higher-skilled employees to effectively implement Chapter 4).
81. Id. § 80132 (enacted by Chapter 4) (instructing the Department of Finance to notify, in writing, the
Chairperson of the Joint Legislative Budget Committee and the chairperson of the appropriations committee in
each house).
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obligate full faith and credit nor taxing powers.82
C. Chapter 9
This statute clarifies and makes technical changes to the bond provisions in
Chapter 4.83 For example, while Chapter 4 authorized the DWR to issue bonds,"
Chapter 9 places a cap on that bond authority.8" This measure also prohibits the
DWR from using revenues collected through bonds issued pursuant to Chapter 4
to repay any undercollected 6 amount due to any electrical corporation. Chapter
9 further requires repayment to the General Fund and DWR to be made as soon
as practicable.8 Finally, Chapter 9 provides for review of lawsuits arising from
Chapter 4 and further protects CPUC orders under Chapter 4 from appellate court
review. 9
V. ANALYSIS OF NEW LEGISLATION
A. Chapter 4
The bond provisions of both Chapter 4 and Chapter 9 receive the most
support. Supporters of the bond provisions are concerned that without the
issuance of bonds, Chapter 4 and other power crisis legislation will deplete the
General Fund and the State will be unable to continue other public interest
programs, including education, health care, and public safety services.90
However, critics assert that the revenue bonds will drive power plants or
cogeneration facilities out of business and decrease the electric supply.9'
82. CAL. WATER CODE § 80132(f) (enacted by Chapter 4) (requiring that each bond contain the
following statement: "Neither the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the State of California is pledged to
the payment of the principal of or interest on this bond.").
83. SENATE RULES COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS of Chapter 9, at I (May 7,2001).
84. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 80130, 80132, 80134 (enacted by Chapter 4).
85. Id. § 80130 (amended by Chapter 9) (limiting the total bond issuance to an aggregate of $13,423,000
or four times the annual revenues generated by the CPA, whichever is lower).
86. California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 842, 598 P.2d 836, 839 (1979)
(stating that under collections occur when the difference between the utility's estimated costs and revenues and
its actual cost experience is higher than anticipated).
87. CAL. WATER CODE § 80200 (amended by Chapter 9).
88. Id. § 80200(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 9).
89. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1731(b) (amended by Chapter 9) (providing guidelines for appellate
review of any CPUC order issued pursuant to Chapter 4).
90. See Letter from Andrew L. Stern, International President, Service Employees International Union
(SEIU), to Rod Wright, Assemblymember (May 1, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (writing on
behalf of the 450,000 employees in California whose jobs rely on funding from the general fund); Letter from
Conni Barker, Director of Government Relations, California Psychiatric Association, to Members of the State
Assembly (May 2, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (expressing concerns about funding for
mental health programs).
91. See Kahl-Pownall Advocates for the Western States Petroleum Association, More Rolling Blackouts
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Assembly Republicans fear that the bond measure fails to address the
increasing need for power supply in California and the immediate issues plaguing
PG&E and SCE including debt and failing credit.9 One senator93 criticizes
Chapters 3 and 4 by claiming that the new legislation will cause Californians to
pay high power prices for many years. 94 He also claims that California's
residential customers are paying for commercial customers' electric use via
95 96taxes.9' Additionally, consumers in a municipally-owned utility district are
paying other districts' utility bills through taxes.97 He asserts that, if California
wants to lower long-term power prices, the State needs to promote a "crash
program" for new power plant construction.98
A main purpose of Chapters 3, 4, and 9 is to allow the DWR to supply the
IOUs' net shortage and to end the rolling blackouts that were leaving
Californians in the dark. 9 However, Chapter 4 does not compel the DWR to
purchase enough power to cover the full shortage.'m The DWR may purchase
only the power it determines is not too expensive. '1 In determining what is too
expensive, the DWR has two main concerns.' O First, the DWR is alarmed by the
increasing rate at which the EPF is being spent. 13 Second, the DWR fears that, if
it buys power regardless of price, the market price will skyrocket. °4 As a result,
the DWR is only covering approximately ninety percent of the net shortage, and
the ISO has ordered the generators to supply the remaining ten percent, without
stating who will pay for it.'05 As a result, Duke Energy filed suit to force DWR to
pay for the ten percent or to force ISO to stop ordering generators to supply the
net shortage without a creditworthy buyer.'°
Certain with Qualifying Facilities Plan: No on SB 31x and AB 8x (March 21, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (defining qualifying facilities as "power plants or cogeneration facilities... that operate on natural
gas, biomass, wind and solar" power).
92. Press Release, Republican Assembly GOP, Assembly GOP Stress More Power Supply (Jan. 17,
2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
93. Memorandum from Thomas McClintock, Senator, to the Senators and Assemblymembers of
California (Jan. 24, 2001) [hereinafter McClintock Memorandum] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. CAL PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10001 (West 1994) (defining a municipally-owned utility as a public utility
that is acquired and operated by a municipality or municipal corporation).
97. McClintock Memorandum, supra note 93, at 2.
98. Id.
99. Letter from Guy Phillips to Assembly Speaker Bob Hertzberg at 1 (Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Phillips Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
100. Id.
101. See CAL. WATER CODE § 80100 (amended by Chapter 4) (stating that the DWR can contract with
any entity to purchase power on such terms and at such prices the DWR deems appropriate).
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B. Deregulation in Other States
Despite the problems California has experienced by deregulating its electric
industry, other states have implemented more successful deregulation plans.
Pennsylvania passed deregulation legislation'0 ' and has fully implemented
deregulation throughout the state.'0 8 Its consumers are enjoying an average price
decrease of thirty percent.' °9 Deregulation experts credit Pennsylvania's success
to several factors: market-based default prices,"'° non-mandatory divestiture of
generation assets,"' accelerated phase-in of all customers,"2 third-party metering
services, and an atmosphere that encouraged alternate providers to enter
Pennsylvania's electricity market and create competition."' Pennsylvania
currently has 130 power suppliers competing for electricity consumers in the
state. 4
Similarly, Texas has set the stage for a successful deregulation plan by
providing for phased-in transition to full retail choice by January 2002,1"
requiring incumbent utilities to restructure their integrated supply chain, " '
6
providing predictable and efficient regulation of new generation plant
construction' 7 and not restricting the contracting abilities of its power suppliers
and buyers."8 One report" 9 on Texas deregulation credits the Texas Legislature
with having defined parameters for deregulation while allowing competition to
evolve naturally. 20
Other states, 2 with less initial deregulation success, have adopted measures
that succeeded in encouraging alternate providers to enter into the market and
increase competition."2 Perhaps California should be looking to Pennsylvania
107. H.R. 1509, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995).
108. Kiesling Report, supra note 25.
109. Id.
110. See id. at Part 2(A) (stating that using a market-based default or standard offer price encouraged
alternate providers to join the Pennsylvania electricity market and compete instead of setting a low standard
offer price that would only benefit incumbent providers).
111. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2804(5) (1996) (amended by Chapter 28).
112. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7405(A)(1) (1996 & Supp. 2002) (amended by Chapter 74) (providing
guidelines for customer choice in electric cooperative territories).
113. Kiesling Report, supra note 25, at Part 2(B).
114. Id.
115. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.102 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2002) (added by SB 7).
116. See id. § 39.051 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2002) (added by SB 7) (providing that utilities must
separate their business activities into "a power generation company; a retail electric provider; and a
transmission and distribution utility," all operating independently),
117. Kiesling Report, supra note 25, at Part 4(B)(2).
118. Id.
119. Id. at Part 4(C).
120. Id.
121. See id., at Executive Summary (listing Massachusetts and Rhode Island as states with implemented
and revised deregulation plans).
122. Id. at Part 4(C).
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rather than to the DWR for deregulation guidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since Chapter 3 ended in February 2001 and has been replaced by Chapter 4,
and Chapter 9 merely makes technical and clarifying changes to Chapter 4-the
most significant of the three chapters.
The DWR is only covering approximately ninety percent of the net shortage
because Chapter 4 does not require the DWR to purchase enough power to cover
the full shortage. 23 Duke Energy Corporation has already filed a lawsuit against
the DWR, and others may follow as a result of the ISO ordering the generators to
supply the remaining ten percent of the shortage. 
24
While Chapter 4 has helped to alleviate the immediate threat of rolling
blackouts by supplying part of the net shortage, it does nothing to foster the
natural evolution of competition like the Pennsylvania and Texas deregulation
plans; instead Chapter 4 only provides more regulation and a short-term fix.'25
123. Phillips Letter, supra note 99, at 1.
124. id.
125. CAL. WATER CODE § 80260 (enacted by Chapter 4) (limiting the term of the DWR's contracting
power to January 1, 2003).
